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Abstract
Double blind T -private information retrieval (DB-TPIR) enables two users, each of whom
privately generates a random index (θ1, θ2, resp.), to efficiently retrieve a message W (θ1, θ2)
labeled by the two indices, from a set of N servers that store all messages W (k1, k2), k1 ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,K1}, k2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K2}, such that the two users’ indices are kept private from
any set of up to T1, T2 colluding servers, respectively, as well as from each other. A DB-
TPIR scheme based on cross-subspace alignment is proposed in this paper, and shown to be
capacity-achieving in the asymptotic setting of large number of messages and bounded latency.
The scheme is then extended to M -way blind X-secure T -private information retrieval (MB-
XSTPIR) with multiple (M ) indices, each generated privately by a different user, arbitrary
privacy levels for each index (T1, T2, · · · , TM ), and arbitrary level of security (X) of data
storage, so that the message W (θ1, θ2, · · · , θM ) can be efficiently retrieved while the stored
data is held secure against collusion among up to X colluding servers, the mth user’s index is
private against collusion among up to Tm servers, and each user’s index θm is private from all
other users. The general scheme relies on a tensor-product based extension of cross-subspace
alignment and retrieves 1−(X+T1+ · · ·+TM )/N bits of desired message per bit of download.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data privacy and security are among the biggest challenges of the modern information
age. Driven by these challenges there is much interest in the building blocks (primitives)
of privacy/security preserving schemes, such as secret sharing [1], oblivious transfer [2],
private information retrieval (PIR) [3], [4], secure multiparty computation (MPC) [5]–[7],
and private simultaneous messages (PSM) [8]. Understanding the fundamental limits
of each of these building blocks is the key to understanding the scope of their potential
applications. The focus of this work is on private information retrieval (PIR).
2Introduced by Chor et al. in [3], [4], the goal of PIR in its simplest form is to allow
a user to efficiently retrieve a desired message from a set of K messages that are
replicated across N distributed servers, while revealing no information to any individual
server about which message is desired. Until recently, PIR was investigated primarily by
computer scientists and cryptographers [3], [4] under the assumption of short messages
(e.g., each message is just one bit), with the goal of minimizing the total communication
(upload and download) cost. However, following the capacity characterization of PIR
in [9], [10] under the assumption of long messages (where downloads dominate the
communication cost), the fundamental limits (capacity) of various forms of download-
efficient PIR have become an active topic in information theory. Recent advances include
the capacity characterizations of PIR with T -privacy [11], symmetric-privacy [12], weak
privacy [13], [14], eavesdroppers and/or Byzantine servers [15]–[19], coded storage [20]–
[27], secure storage [28]–[30], limited storage [31]–[35], cached data or side information
[36]–[40], multiple rounds [41], [42], multiple desired messages [43]–[46], upload con-
straints [47], arbitrary collusion patterns [21], [48], as well as applications of PIR to
private computation [49]–[52], private search [53], private set intersection [46], coded
computing [54], locally decodable codes [55], etc.
Our goal in this work is to further expand the understanding of download-efficient
PIR in a new direction — M-way blind X-secure T -PIR or MB-XSTPIR, where the data,
labeled byM indices, is stored in an X-secure fashion by N servers, andM users jointly
retrieve a desired message by specifying one index each (user m privately generates θm,
∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}), while keeping their choice of index private from each other and
also from the servers where the data is stored. It is conceivable that such a functionality
may be directly useful, e.g., for M-way blind medical studies where the confidential
patient health data is indexed by multiple attributes (e.g., the diagnosis, treatment
(drug/placebo), doctor, hospital, health insurance). The multiway blind functionality
is also useful for secure multiparty computation1 where the messages are deterministic,
i.e., W (θ1, θ2, · · · , θM ) is a function of (θ1, θ2, · · · , θM) [56]. Fundamentally, however, our
motivation is simply to expand the scope of a basic primitive.
1A notable limitation is that M -way blind PIR allows communication only between users and servers, but Secure
MPC protocols may in general also allow direct communication between users.
3The main contribution of this work is a cross-subspace alignment based scheme for
MB-XSTPIR. In order to introduce the scheme in a more transparent setting, our initial
focus is on DB-TPIR, i.e., the double-blind setting (M = 2) with T -private user indices
(T1, T2, resp.) and replicated data storage, initially with no data-security, i.e., X = 0.
This basic setting allows us to convey the main ideas behind the construction of the
scheme and also to explore its optimality. Specifically, for the DB-TPIR problem we
propose a scheme based on cross-subspace alignment [54] which allows the retrieval of
1− (T1 + T2)/N bits of desired message per bit of download, regardless of the number
of messages. By noting connections between this problem and X-secure T -private in-
formation retrieval (XSTPIR) [29] we show that 1 − (T1 + T2)/N is also the asymptotic
capacity of DB-TPIR as the number of messages approaches infinity, provided that the
number of bits of each message that are jointly encoded is bounded (say, due to latency
constraints).
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Fig. 1. The double blind T -private information retrieval problem.
With the insights obtained from DB-TPIR, we are then able to fully generalize our
achievable scheme to MB-XSTPIR, i.e., M-way blind X-secure T -private information
retrieval (MB-XSTPIR) with multiple (M) indices, each generated privately by a different
user, arbitrary privacy levels for each index (T1, T2, · · · , TM ), and arbitrary level of
security (X) of data storage, so that the message W (θ1, θ2, · · · , θM) can be efficiently
retrieved by the users while the stored data is held secure against collusion among up
to X colluding servers, the mth user’s index is private against collusion among up to
Tm servers, and each user’s index θm is private from all other users. The general setting
4is based on an M-way tensor-product extension of cross-subspace alignment codes, and
retrieves 1 − (X + T1 + · · ·+ TM)/N bits of desired message per bit of download. This
generalizes the known asymptotically (large number of messages) optimal schemes for
various special cases of MB-XSTPIR including DB-TPIR (M = 2, X = 0) and XSTPIR
(M = 1) [29] (which automatically recovers asymptotically optimal schemes for TPIR
(X = 0,M = 1) [11] and PIR (X = 0,M = 1, T1 = 1) [10] as well). In fact, the achievable
scheme for MB-XSTPIR also satisfies symmetric-privacy, i.e., the users learn nothing
about the database or each others’ indices, beyond the desired message. Therefore, it
also yields symmetrically private schemes as special cases. For example, the general
MB-XSTPIR scheme yields a capacity achieving scheme for Symmetric XSTPIR (M = 1)
[57], STPIR (M = 1, X = 0, Symmetric Privacy) [22] and SPIR (M = 1, X = 0, T1 = 1) as
well. Based on all these observations, we conjecture that the general MB-XSTPIR scheme
is also asymptotically optimal.
In order to compare the new scheme with state of art, a natural baseline is obtained
from [56] where a secure multiparty computation (MPC) scheme is constructed based on
symmetric-PIR (SPIR) as a building block. This construction can be naturally generalized
to a DBPIR scheme. Intuitively, this construction is based on a partitioning of N servers
into
√
N groups of
√
N servers each, such that within each sub-group the SPIR scheme
is executed for one user, while across sub-groups the SPIR scheme is executed for the
other user. However, even with the most efficient SPIR scheme as the building block,
the rate of this construction for DBPIR is
(
1− 1/√N
)2
, which is strictly smaller than
the rate 1− 2/N achieved by our asymptotically optimal scheme. This is because cross-
subspace alignment allows us to avoid the 2-way partitioning of servers and is able
to gain significant efficiency by jointly exploiting all servers. For example, with N = 4
servers, the partitioning based approach achieves a rate of
(
1− 1/√N
)2
= 1/4, while
the new scheme achieves a 100% higher rate of 1 − 2/N = 1/2 due to cross-subspace
alignment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II formalizes the general MB-XSTPIR
problem. Section III states the main results of this paper in the form of two theorems.
Their proofs are presented in Section IV and Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: For any two integers a, b such that a ≤ b, let [a : b] denote the set {a, a +
1, · · · , b}. LetX[a:b] denote the set {Xa, Xa+1, · · · , Xb}. For any index set I = {i1, i2, · · · , in},
5XI denotes the set {Xi1 , Xi2, · · · , Xin}. For two vectors A and B, A ⊥⊥ B denotes that
they are linearly independent. The notation A′ denotes the transpose of A, and A(i)
denotes the ith entry of A. For an n-dimensional tensor C, the notation C(i1, i2, · · · , in)
represents the entry at the corresponding position of C. If C is a two-dimensional tensor,
then it is a matrix and C(i1, i2) denotes the (i1, i2)
th entry of matrix C. The notation (x)+
denotes max(x, 0).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT: MB-XSTPIR
Consider a database W comprised of K = K1K2 · · ·KM messages, indexed as
W =
(
W(k1, k2, · · · , kM)
)
k1∈[1:K1],··· ,kM∈[1:KM ]
. (1)
Each message consists of a stream of i.i.d. uniform symbols drawn from a finite
field Fq. The stream of symbols implies that the message lengths are unbounded (a
standard assumption in information theory). However, we are interested primarily in
bounded-latency MB-XSTPIR schemes, i.e., schemes that code over a bounded number
of symbols, say L symbols, of each message. By bounded L, we mean that L is O(1)
in the parameters K1, K2, · · · , KM . In other words, the number of symbols that are
jointly encoded by the MB-XSTPIR scheme is bounded even as the number of messages
approaches infinity. This assumption is important in practice, especially for streaming
or dynamic data, because the number of symbols that are coded together determines
the coding delay for streaming data. To our knowledge, for all PIR settings where the
asymptotic (large number of messages) capacity is known, it is achieved by bounded-
latency schemes [26]. So we do not expect the bounded latency assumption to affect
the asymptotic capacity of MB-XSTPIR. But it will be a useful assumption for converse
arguments for the special case of DB-TPIR (Double Blind T -PIR). Another issue worth
clarifying is that even though L is bounded while the number of messages is allowed
to be much larger, the downloads still dominate the communication cost because the
same queries can be re-used repeatedly to download the unbounded desired message
stream, L symbols at a time.
Under the bounded latency assumption, without loss of generality we will assume
that each message has length L symbols. In q-ary units,
H(W(k1, k2, · · ·kM)) = L, ∀k1 ∈ [1 : K1], · · · , kM ∈ [1 : KM ], (2)
6H(W) =
∑
k1∈[1:K1],··· ,kM∈[1:KM ]
H
(
W(k1, k2, · · · kM)
)
= K1K2 · · ·KML. (3)
The database W is stored at N distributed servers according to an X-secure storage
scheme. Let the storage at the nth server be denoted by Sn, n ∈ [1 : N ]. An X-secure
storage scheme ensures that any set of up to X colluding servers cannot learn anything
about the database W.
[X-Security] I(W;SX ) = 0, ∀X ⊂ [1 : N ], |X | ≤ X. (4)
The setting X = 0 corresponds to replicated storage, where we set Sn = W, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ].
There are M users. The user m,m ∈ [1 : M ] generates the index θm which is uniform
over [1 : Km]. The M users want to retrieve the message W(θ1, θ2, · · · , θM). The mth user
must keep his index private against collusion among any set of up to Tm servers. Each
user must also keep his index private against other users.
To this end, we assume each user m has his own private randomness Zm. The N
servers share2 common randomness Z˜ that is not available to the users. The indepen-
dence among these entities is formalized as follows.
H(S[1:N ], Z˜, (θm)m∈[1:M ], (Zm)m∈[1:M ])
=H(S[1:N ]) +H(Z˜) +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
H(θm) +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
H(Zm).
(5)
In order to retrieve the desired message, User m generates N queries Q
(m,θm)
1 , Q
(m,θm)
2 ,
· · · , Q(m,θm)N based on his index θm and his private randomness Zm. Specifically,
H(Q
(m,θm)
[1:N ] |θm,Zm) = 0, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ]. (6)
The corresponding queries from all M users, (Q
(m,θm)
n )m∈[1:M ] are sent to the n
th server,
for all n ∈ [1 : N ]. Upon receiving the queries, the nth server generates its answer
A
(θ1,··· ,θM )
n as a function of the queries, the stored information and the server-side com-
mon randomness.
H(A(θ1,··· ,θM )n |Sn, (Q(m,θm)n )m∈[1:M ], Z˜) = 0. (7)
2We need common randomness at the servers only to ensure perfect inter-user privacy, as in (9). Remarkably,
almost-perfect inter-user privacy can be guaranteed (for large messages) even without common randomness at servers
(see Corollary 2).
7The privacy constraints consist of two parts.
1) (Tm)-Privacy. This means that any Tm or fewer servers have no knowledge about
θm,
I(θm; (Q
(i,θi)
T )i∈[1:M ]|ST , Z˜) = 0, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ], T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | ≤ Tm. (8)
2) Inter-user Privacy. This means that any user must learn nothing about other users’
indices.
I
(
(θm)m∈[1:M ]\{m};A
(θ1,··· ,θM )
[1:N ] |θm,Zm,W(θ1, · · · , θM)
)
= 0, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ]. (9)
With the answers from the N servers, each user must be able to recover the desired
message.
[Correctness] H(W(θ1, · · · , θM)|A(θ1,··· ,θM )[1:N ] , θm,Zm) = 0, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ]. (10)
Recall that the rate of a PIR scheme is the number of bits of desired message that can
be retrieved per bit of total download. Therefore, if D is the maximum number of q-
ary symbols downloaded from all servers by a user, under an MB-XSTPIR scheme that
allows the user to retrieve L q-ary symbols of the desired message, then the rate of such
a scheme is denoted as,
R =
L
D
. (11)
The main contribution of this work is an achievable scheme for MB-XSTPIR that is
based on cross-subspace alignment, and achieves the rate 1− (X +T1+ · · ·+TM)/N , for
arbitrary number of messages K1, K2, · · · , KM . Note that the scheme itself is not limited
to asymptotic settings. Asymptotic settings will be of interest primarily for the purpose
of testing the optimality of the scheme for significant special cases.
In order to introduce the scheme in a transparent setting, and to gain deeper in-
sights into its optimality, we focus in particular on Double Blind T -PIR (DB-TPIR),
which is obtained as a special case of MB-XSTPIR by setting M = 2, X = 0. Given
q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2 let us denote the supremum of rates achievable by any DB-TPIR
scheme with these parameters as R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2). Specifically, from the
optimality perspective, we are interested in the asymptotic capacity of DB-TPIR as
8K1, K2 → ∞. Under the bounded latency (b.l.) constraint, this asymptotic capacity is
defined3 as
C∞,b.l.DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2)
△
= sup
q,L
lim
K1,K2→∞
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2). (13)
In plain words, C∞,b.l.DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2) is the highest rate possible for any DB-TPIR scheme
when the number of messages is much larger than the number of bits of each message
that are jointly encoded by the scheme.
Remark: Note that the bounded-latency constraint affects the order in which the supre-
mum is taken over message size parameters (q, L) versus the limit on the number of
messages (K1, K2). Without the bounded latency constraint, the asymptotic capacity as
the number of messages approaches infinity, would be defined as
C∞DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2) = lim
K1,K2→∞
sup
q,L
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2). (14)
Comparing (14) with (13), we note the key difference is that in (14), the supremum
over message size (q, L) allows message sizes to approach infinty for a fixed number of
messages, and only then the number of messages approaches infinity, whereas in (13)
it is the number of messages (K1, K2) that approaches infinity first for a given message
size (q, L are bounded, i.e., O(1) in K1, K2), and only then the size of the message is
allowed to grow. In a nutshell, (14) corresponds to asymptotic settings with qL ≫ K1, K2,
while (13) corresponds to asymptotic settings with qL ≪ K1, K2, thus prioritizing coding
latency.
III. RESULTS
We begin with the asymptotic capacity characterization of DB-TPIR under the bounded-
latency constraint.
3For a double sequence s(K1,K2), the notation limK1,K2→∞ s(K1,K2) = a means that ∀ǫ > 0,∃κ = κ(ǫ) such that
|s(K1,K2) − a| < ǫ,∀K1,K2 ≥ κ. (see Definition 2.1 in [58]). It follows from Theorem 4.2 in [58] that the double
limit limK1,K2→∞R
∗
DB-TPIR exists. This is because R
∗
DB-TPIR is a decreasing sequence in each of K1 and K2 parameters
individually (because any scheme that works with more messages also works with fewer messages), and is bounded
below by zero. It also follows from Theorem 4.2 in [58] that
lim
K1,K2→∞
R
∗
DB-TPIR = lim
K1→∞
lim
K2→∞
R
∗
DB-TPIR. (12)
9Theorem 1. The asymptotic capacity of DB-TPIR subject to bounded-latency constraint is
C∞,b.l.DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2) =
(
1−
(
T1 + T2
N
))+
. (15)
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section IV. Notably, the achievability of the
rate expression that appears on the RHS of (15) needs neither the bounded-latency
assumption, nor the asymptotic setting. Both of those are needed primarily for the
converse argument. Without the bounded-latency constraint, the asymptotic capacity of
DB-TPIR is bounded according to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (
1−
(
T1 + T2
N
))
≤ C∞DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2) ≤ min
(
1− T1
N
, 1− T2
N
)
. (16)
The proof of Corollary 1 appears in Appendix A. The lower bound in (16) follows
directly from the proof of achievability of Theorem 1. The upper bound in (16) is
obtained by noting that DB-TPIR schemes automatically yield TPIR schemes. In fact, as
shown in the proof of Corollary 1, the optimal rate of DB-TPIR in the non-asymptotic
setting can also be bounded by the capacity of TPIR as
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2) ≤ min
(
1− T1/N
1− (T1/N)K1 ,
1− T2/N
1− (T2/N)K2
)
.
Next we examine the need for common randomness across servers. Common random-
ness is needed across servers primarily to preserve inter-user privacy, i.e., to keep each
user’s index private from other users. While in the absence of common randomness, our
achievable scheme does not preserve inter-user privacy perfectly, it is remarkable that
the scheme manages to preserve inter-user privacy almost-perfectly for large alphabet. In
other words, the amount of information leaked to a user about the other user’s index,
is vanishingly small as q → ∞. Corollary 2 highlights this observation by studying
explicitly the case T1 = T2 = 1, K1 = K2 = K.
Corollary 2. Let B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] denote the answers generated by the N servers after eliminating
common randomness between servers (setting all symbols associated with Z˜ to zero in our
10
achievable scheme for DB-TPIR). For T1 = T2 = 1, K1 = K2 = K, and for any ǫ > 0, there
exists q0 > 0 s.t. when q ≥ q0 (q is the size of the finite field Fq),
I(θ2;B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] |θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) ≤ ǫ, (17)
I(θ1;B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] |θ2,Z2,W(θ1, θ2)) ≤ ǫ. (18)
The proof of Corollary 2 appears in Appendix B.
Our final result generalizes the achievable scheme from DB-TPIR to MB-XSTPIR based
on a tensor-product extension of cross-subspace alignment. The achievable rate of the
general scheme is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the MB-XSTPIR problem defined in Section II, the following rate is achievable
regardless of the number of messages K1, K2, · · · , KM .
RMB-XSTPIR = 1− X + T1 + T2 + · · ·+ TM
N
. (19)
Intuitively, this rate expression indicates that with this scheme one symbol is down-
loaded from each server, and from those N symbols each user is able to recover L =
N− (X+T1+T2+ · · ·+TM) symbols of the desired message W(θ1, θ2, · · · , θM), while the
interference is aligned within X + T1 + T2 + · · ·+ TM dimensions. Theorem 2 is proved
in Section V.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC CAPACITY OF DB-TPIR
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
A. Theorem 1: Converse
Let us find an upper bound on the capacity of DB-TPIR by noting a relationship
between DB-TPIR and X-secure T -private information retrieval (XSTPIR) [29]. Recall
that XSTPIR is a special case of MB-XSTPIR obtained by setting M = 1. The capacity of
XSTPIR with N distributed servers, K messages, X-secure data storage, and T -private
queries is denoted as CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ). Recall that the asymptotic capacity of XSTPIR
(as K →∞) is shown in [29] to be C∞XSTPIR(N,X, T ) =
(
1− X+T
N
)+
.
We will need the following lemma.
11
Lemma 1. Let R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2) denote the supremum of rates achievable by any
DB-TPIR scheme for the parameters q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2 as defined in Section II. Then for
K2 = q
LK1 , we have,
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2 = q
LK1, T1, T2) ≤ CXSTPIR(N,K = K1, X = T2, T = T1). (20)
Proof. Consider a K1×K2 matrix w whose elements are from FLq . The K2 column vectors
are all distinct and, say, arranged in lexicographic order. Since K2 = q
LK1 , the column
vectors of the matrix include all qLK1 possible realizations of K1 × 1 vectors over FLq ,
and w is uniquely specified. We claim that any construction of a DB-TPIR scheme for
the parameter values specified on the LHS of (20), when applied with the particular
realization of the database W = w, yields an XSTPIR scheme with the parameters
specified on the RHS of (20).
Let us describe this XSTPIR scheme. In this XSTPIR scheme the user corresponds to
User 1 of the DB-TPIR scheme. Each Server n stores only Q
(2,θ2)
n . Note that w is a constant
matrix known to everyone, whose θth2 column specifies the realizations of the K1 i.i.d.
messages (one of which is desired by the user), each comprised of L uniformly random
i.i.d. symbols from Fq. Since θ2 is T2-private according to the DB-TPIR construction,
this constitutes X = T2-secure storage of the K1 messages. Furthermore, based on the
T1-private queries, Q
(1,θ1)
n , provided by the user, each server is able to respond as in
the DB-TPIR scheme (because Q
(2,θ2)
n is already known to Server n), and the DB-TPIR
construction guarantees that the desired message w(θ1, θ2) is correctly retrieved. Finally,
since the rate of an XSTPIR scheme cannot be higher than the capacity of XSTPIR, the
proof of Lemma 1 is complete. 
Remark: The XSTPIR scheme that we obtain from the DB-TPIR scheme described
above, allows common randomness between servers. While the original formulation
of XSTPIR in [29] does not explicitly allow common randomness, it is readily verified
that server-side common randomness can be included in the storage of each server in
the model of [29], and the asymptotic capacity result still holds.
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Proof of Converse of Theorem 1
With the help of Lemma 1 and (12) (in Footnote 3), we are now ready to prove the
converse for Theorem 1.
C∞,b.l.DB-TPIR(N, T1, T2) = sup
q,L
lim
K1,K2→∞
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2) (21)
= sup
q,L
lim
K1→∞
(
lim
K2→∞
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N,K1, K2, T1, T2)
)
(22)
≤ sup
q,L
lim
K1→∞
(
lim
K2→∞
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N, logqL(K1), K2, T1, T2)
)
(23)
≤ sup
q,L
lim
K1→∞
R∗DB-TPIR(q, L,N, logqL(K1), K1, T1, T2) (24)
≤ sup
q,L
lim
K1→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K = logqL(K1), X = T2, T = T1) (25)
= sup
q,L
lim
K→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K,X = T2, T = T1) (26)
= lim
K→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K,X = T2, T = T1) (27)
=
 1−
(
T1+T2
N
)
, N > T1 + T2
0, N ≤ T1 + T2.
(28)
The first step, (22), follows directly from (12). In (23) we used the fact that reducing
the number of messages cannot hurt the rate (because the original scheme can still be
used with fewer messages). The next step, (24) follows because when K2 → ∞, K1
is viewed as a constant which is less than K2 and reducing the number of messages
cannot hurt the rate. For (25) we used Lemma 1. The next step, (26) follows because for
fixed q, L, and K = logqL(K1), the condition that K1 →∞ is equivalent to the condition
that K → ∞. Next, (27) follows because the capacity expression is not a function of q
or L. Finally, the asymptotic capacity characterization for XSTPIR from [29] is used for
(28). Thus, the proof of the converse part of Theorem 1 is complete. 
B. Theorem 1: Achievability
In this section, we prove the achievability of Theorem 1 by constructing a scheme
based on Cross Subspace Alignment (CSA) Codes [54], that can achieve the rate
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(1− (T1 + T2)/N)+ for arbitrary N,K1, K2, T1, T2. We will focus only on the non-trivial
case, N > T1 + T2. Throughout this scheme we set,
L = N − (T1 + T2). (29)
Each message W(i, j), i ∈ [1 : K1], j ∈ [1 : K2] consists of L symbols from finite field
Fq, denoted as W(i, j) = (W(i, j)
(1),W(i, j)(2), · · · ,W(i, j)(L)). For the scheme we will
need the following L+N distinct constants from Fq,
f1, f2, · · · , fL, α1, α2, · · · , αN (30)
that are known to all N servers and the 2 users. Note that this implies that q ≥ L+N .
Let us split the messages W into L matrices (W(1),W(2), · · · ,W(L)) so that W(l), l ∈
[1 : L] contains the lth symbol of each message. Specifically,
W(l) =

W(1, 1)(l) W(1, 2)(l) · · · W(1, K2)(l)
W(2, 1)(l) W(2, 2)(l) · · · W(2, K2)(l)
...
...
...
...
W(K1, 1)
(l) W(K1, 2)
(l) · · · W(K1, K2)(l)
 . (31)
Note that we write equivalently W(l)(θ1, θ2) = W(θ1, θ2)
(l).
Let Q1,θ1 (Q2,θ2) be the column vector with K1 (K2) entries whose θ
th
1 (θ
th
2 ) entry is 1
while other entries are all 0s. The lth symbol of W(θ1, θ2) can be expressed as
W(θ1, θ2)
(l) = Q′1,θ1W
(l)Q2,θ2 . (32)
Note here Q′1,θ1W
(l) is the θth1 row of matrix W
(l). The inner product of θth1 row with
Q2,θ2 is the entry at the θ
th
2 column of this row, i.e., W(θ1, θ2)
(l). The proposed scheme
will enable the 2 users to retrieve W(θ1, θ2)
(l), ∀l ∈ [1 : L], thus, retrieving W(θ1, θ2).
The private randomness available to each user is specified as,
Z1 = {Z(l)1,t | t ∈ [1 : T1], l ∈ [1 : L]}, (33)
Z2 = {Z(l)2,t | t ∈ [1 : T2], l ∈ [1 : L]}. (34)
The random vectors Z
(l)
1,t ∈ FK1×1q ,Z(l)2,t ∈ FK2×1q have their elements drawn i.i.d. uniform
from Fq.
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The query sent by user m,m ∈ {1, 2} to the nth server, Q(m,θm)n is constructed as
Q
(m,θm)
n = (Q
(m,θm)
n,1 , Q
(m,θm)
n,2 , · · · , Q(m,θm)n,L ) where ∀l ∈ [1 : L]
Q
(m,θm)
n,l = Qm,θm +
∑
t∈[1:Tm]
(fl − αn)tZ(l)m,t. (35)
Specifically, Q
(m,θm)
n,l ∈ FKm×1q can be viewed as the query from user m to request the
lth symbol of the wanted message. Tm-privacy constraint is satisfied since Q
(m,θm)
n,l is the
Shamir’s secret sharing [1] of Qm,θm . Up to Tm colluding servers can learn nothing about
Qm,θm , thus, learning nothing about θm.
Upon receiving queries from both users, the nth server computes an intermediate
result
B(θ1,θ2)n =
∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n,l
′
W(l)Q
(2,θ2)
n,l (36)
=
1
f1 − αn Q
′
1,θ1
W(1)Q2,θ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
W(θ1,θ2)(1)
+ · · ·+ 1
fL − αn Q
′
1,θ1
W(L)Q2,θ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
W(θ1,θ2)(L)
+ I0 + αnI1 + · · ·+ αT1+T2−1n IT1+T2−1.
(37)
From (36) to (37), distributive law is used. Note that (37) can be viewed as a polynomial
of αn. The coefficients of the first L terms are the L symbols of the desired message.
Ii, i ∈ [0 : T1 + T2 − 1] stands for the remaining (interference) terms that are generated
by the product of the matrices in (36). The highest power of αn is T1 + T2 − 1 and can
be found from ∑
l∈[1:L]
(fl − αn)T1+T2−1Z(l)1,T1
′
W(l)Z
(l)
2,T2
.
Note that the interference terms of (37), except the one of highest order, may contain
some information of the index generated by a user. For example, I0 contains
1
fl − αnQ
′
1,θ1W
(l)(fl − αn)Z(l)2,1 = Q′1,θ1W(l)Z(l)2,1,
which means that User 2 may get some information about the index θ1 generated by
User 1 from the interference terms. To protect against this leakage of information, Server
n will add noise drawn from the common randomness that is shared by all servers. The
common randomness shared among N servers is specified as,
Z˜ = {Z˜i | i ∈ [0 : T1 + T2 − 1]}, (38)
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where (Z˜i)i∈[0:T1+T2−1] are T1+T2 random variables that are i.i.d. uniform over Fq. Server
n will add the polynomial
Z˜(αn) = Z˜0 + αnZ˜1 + · · ·+ αT1+T2−1n Z˜T1+T2−1 (39)
to the intermediate result B
(θ1,θ2)
n to generate its answer A
(θ1,θ2)
n . This is the answer sent
to both users.
A(θ1,θ2)n = B
(θ1,θ2)
n + Z˜(α) (40)
=
1
f1 − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(1) + · · ·+ 1
fL − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(L)
+ (I0 + Z˜0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
+ · · ·+ αT1+T2−1n (IT1+T2−1 + Z˜T1+T2−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
JT1+T2−1
.
(41)
Rewriting (41) in matrix multiplication form, we have

A
(θ1,θ2)
1
A
(θ1,θ2)
2
...
A
(θ1,θ2)
N
 =

1
f1−α1
1
f2−α1
· · · 1
fL−α1
1 α1 · · · αT1+T2−11
1
f1−α2
1
f2−α2
· · · 1
fL−α2
1 α2 · · · αT1+T2−12
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
f1−αN
1
f2−αN
· · · 1
fL−αN
1 αN · · · αT1+T2−1N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

W(θ1, θ2)
(1)
W(θ1, θ2)
(2)
...
W(θ1, θ2)
(L)
J0
...
JT1+T2−1

. (42)
The matrix C is a Cauchy-Vandermonde matrix of size N × N since N = L + T1 + T2.
Since fl, l ∈ [1 : L], αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are L+N distinct elements of Fq, according to [59], C
is invertible in Fq. Thus, the answers from all the N servers form an invertible function
of W(θ1, θ2), J0, · · ·JT1+T2−1. In other words, the correctness constraint is satisfied.
Let us consider the user-user privacy. Without loss of generality, let us consider User
1. We have
I(θ2;A
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] |θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (43)
= I(θ2;W(θ1, θ2), J[0:2T−1]|θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (44)
= I(θ2; J[0:T1+T2−1]|θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) = 0. (45)
(45) comes from the fact that J[0:T1+T2−1] are protected by T1+T2 random symbols shared
among servers, which are uniformly i.i.d. over Fq and are independent of all other terms
in (45).
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Finally, note that since L = N−(T1+T2) symbols of the desired message are retrieved
from a total of N downloaded symbols from all N servers, the rate of this scheme is
L/N = 1− (T1 + T2)/N .
C. Examples for Illustration
We use α instead of αn for compact notation, with the understanding that Server n
replaces α with αn.
1) L = 1, T1 = T2 = 1 with N = 3 Servers: Since L = 1, T = 1, we neglect the l, t
on superscripts or subscripts of all symbols. The queries from the 2 users are listed as
follows.
Server ‘n’ (Replace α with αn)
Q
(1,θ1)
n Q1,θ1 + (f1 − α)Z1
Q
(2,θ2)
n Q2,θ2 + (f1 − α)Z2
The intermediate result is computed as
B(θ1,θ2)n =
1
f1 − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n
′
WQ(2,θ2)n
=
1
f1 − αn ·
(
Q′1,θ1 + (f1 − αn)Z′1
)
·W ·
(
Q2,θ2 + (f1 − αn)Z2
)
=
1
f1 − αnQ
′
1,θ1
WQ2,θ2 +
(
Z′1WQ2,θ2 +Q
′
1,θ1
WZ2
)
+ (f1 − αn)Z′1WZ2
=
1
f1 − αnW(θ1, θ2) +
(
Z′1WQ2,θ2 +Q
′
1,θ1WZ2 + fZ
′
1WZ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I0
+αn (−Z′1WZ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
.
The answer from the server is
A(θ1,θ2)n = B
(θ1,θ2)
n + Z˜0 + αnZ˜1
=
1
f1 − αnW(θ1, θ2) + J0 + αnJ1.
Writing in matrix form, the answers from N = 3 servers are
A
(θ1,θ2)
1
A
(θ1,θ2)
2
A
(θ1,θ2)
3
 =

1
f1−α1
1 α1
1
f1−α2
1 α2
1
f1−α3
1 α3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

W(θ1, θ2)
J0
J1
 .
The desired message is retrieved by inverting the matrix C. Since L = N − (T1+T2) = 1
symbol of the desired message is retrieved from a total of N = 3 downloaded symbols
from all 3 servers, the rate of the scheme is L/N = 1/3.
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2) L = 2, T1 = 1, T2 = 2 with N = 5 Servers: The queries from the 2 users are listed as
follows.
Server ‘n’ (Replace α with αn)
Q
(1,θ1)
n,1 Q1,θ1 + (f1 − α)Z(1)1,1
Q
(1,θ1)
n,2 Q1,θ1 + (f2 − α)Z(2)1,1
Q
(2,θ2)
n,1 Q2,θ2 + (f1 − α)Z(1)2,1 + (f1 − α)2Z(1)2,2
Q
(2,θ2)
n,2 Q2,θ2 + (f2 − α)Z(2)2,1 + (f2 − α)2Z(2)2,2
The intermediate result is
B(θ1,θ2)n =
1
f1 − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n,1
′
W(1)Q
(2,θ2)
n,1 +
1
f2 − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n,2
′
W(2)Q
(2,θ2)
n,2
=
1
f1 − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(1) +
1
f2 − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(2) + I0 + · · ·+ α2nI2.
The answer is
A(θ1,θ2)n =
1
f1 − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(1) +
1
f2 − αnW(θ1, θ2)
(2) + (I0 + Z˜0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
+ · · ·+ α2n (I2 + Z˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
.
Writing in matrix form, the answers from N = 5 servers are
A
(θ1,θ2)
1
A
(θ1,θ2)
2
A
(θ1,θ2)
3
A
(θ1,θ2)
4
A
(θ1,θ2)
5

=

1
f1−α1
1
f2−α1
1 α1 α
2
1
1
f1−α2
1
f2−α2
1 α2 α
2
2
1
f1−α3
1
f2−α3
1 α3 α
2
3
1
f1−α4
1
f2−α4
1 α4 α
2
4
1
f1−α5
1
f2−α5
1 α5 α
2
5

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

W(θ1, θ2)
(1)
W(θ1, θ2)
(2)
J0
J1
J2

.
Evidently, the rate achieved is L/N = 2/5 in this case.
V. M -WAY BLIND X -SECURE T -PRIVATE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
In this section, we propose a scheme that solves the generalized problem: M-way
blind X-secure T -private information retrieval (MB-XSTPIR). The rate achieved by this
scheme is R = 1− (X + T1 + · · ·+ TM)/N .
MB-XSTPIR has been formalized in Section II. In brief, MB-XSTPIR enables M users
who independently generateM indices θ1, · · · , θM (θm generated by user m) to retrieve a
message W(θ1, · · · , θM) from a database W which is X-securely stored at N distributed
servers, with (Tm)-Privacy and User-User Privacy constraints satified.
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The MB-XSTPIR scheme proposed in this section is still based on Cross Subspace
Alignment (CSA) and is a natural extension of the DB-TPIR scheme. The main dif-
ference is that in this case, the database W is an M-dimensional tensor instead of a
2-dimensional matrix in DB-TPIR.
A. Brief Review of Tensors
Let us briefly review the key properties of tensors that we will need. Specifically, an
M-dimensional tensor is an M-dimensional array. For instance a 2-dimensional tensor
is a matrix, and a 3-dimensional tensor is a cuboid made up of several matrices. Each
dimension of a tensor is called a mode. The mth dimension is called mode-m. The tensor
operation we mainly need is the operation called mode-m tensor vector multiplication.
Readers can refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2 of [60] for more details.
Definition 1. Mode-m Tensor Vector Multiplication. The mode-m multiplication of a tensor
A ∈ FK1×K2×···×KMq with a column vector b ∈ FKm×1q results in the tensor,
C = A×m b, (46)
where C ∈ FK1×···×Km−1×1×Km+1×···×KMq , and each element of C is specified as
C(k1, · · · , km−1, 1, km+1, · · · , kM) =
∑
km∈[1:Km]
A(k1, . . . , kM) · b(km). (47)
Note that this operation is a multi-linear operation, so distributive law applies to this
operation.
B. General MB-XSTPIR Scheme
Throughout this scheme we set L = N − (T1 + T2 + · · ·+ TM) −X . Let Fq be a finite
field with q ≥ L + N and let f1, · · · , fL, α1, · · · , αN be L + N distinct elements in Fq.
These L+N elements are known to the N servers and M users.
The private randomness available at user m to keep his index θm Tm-private is
Zm = {Z(l)m,t | t ∈ [1 : Tm], l ∈ [1 : L]}, ∀m ∈ [1 : M ], (48)
where the column vectors Z
(l)
m,t ∈ FKm×1q have entries drawn i.i.d. uniform from Fq.
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For compact notation, we write
∑
Tm instead of
∑
m∈[1:M ] Tm. The common random-
ness Z˜ shared among N servers for protecting inter-user privacy is specified as
Z˜ =
{
Z˜i | i ∈
[
0 :
∑
Tm +X − 1
]}
, (49)
where Z˜i, i ∈ [0 :
∑
Tm+X − 1] are
∑
Tm+X random noise variables that are i.i.d. and
uniform over Fq.
To form X-secure storage of the data, let us introduce
Ẑ = {Ẑl,x | x ∈ [1 : X ], l ∈ [1 : L]}, (50)
which are independent uniform random noise tensors from FK1×···×KMq .
The database W can be split into L parts, each of which is an M-dimensional tensor.
This partitioning is specified as
W = (W(1),W(2), · · · ,W(L)), W(l) ∈ FK1×K2×···×Kmq , ∀l ∈ [1 : L], (51)
so that W(l) contains the lth symbol of every message.
The independence between the messages, indices, and noises is specified as
H(W, (θm)m∈[1:M ], (Zm)m∈[1:M ], Z˜, Ẑ)
=
∑
l∈[1:L]
H(W(l)) +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
H(θm) +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
H(Zm) +H(Z˜) +H(Ẑ)
=LK1 · · ·KM +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
H(θm) +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
LKmTm +
∑
m∈[1:M ]
Tm +X + LK1 · · ·KMX.
(52)
To keep the database W X-secure, W is secret-shared among N servers. The nth
server holds the share Sn = (S
(1)
n , · · · ,S(L)n ) where
S(l)n = W
(l) +
∑
x∈[1:X]
(fl − αn)xẐl,x. (53)
As before, let Qm,θm be the column vector with Km entries whose θ
th
m entry is 1 while
other entries are all 0s. With the tensor vector multiplication defined above, the desired
message can be written as
W(θ1, · · · , θM) = (W(l)(θ1, · · · , θM))l∈[1:L]
= (W(l) ×1 Q1,θ1 ×2 Q2,θ2 ×3 · · · ×M QM,θM )l∈[1:L].
(54)
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To guarantee Tm-privacy, the index generated by the m
th user is protected by Tm ran-
dom noise vectors. The queries sent from the mth user to the nth server are constructed
as Q
(m,θm)
n = (Q
(m,θm)
n,1 , Q
(m,θm)
n,2 , · · · , Q(m,θm)n,L ) where
Q
(m,θm)
n,l = Qm,θm +
∑
t∈[1:Tm]
(fl − αn)tZ(l)m,t, ∀l ∈ [1 : L], m ∈ [1 : M ]. (55)
With the queries from the M users and stored Sn, the n
th server first computes an
intermediate result
B(θ1,θ2,··· ,θM )n =
∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αnS
(l)
n ×1 Q(1,θ1)n,l ×2 Q(2θ2)n,l ×3 · · · ×M Q(M,θM )n,l
=
∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αnW
(l) ×1 Q1,θ1 ×2 · · · ×M QM,θM + I0 + αnI1 + · · ·
+ α
∑
Tm+X−1
n I
∑
Tm+X−1
=
∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αnW
(l)(θ1, · · · , θM) + I0 + αnI1 + · · ·+ α
∑
Tm+X−1
n I
∑
Tm+X−1.
(56)
As before, I0, · · · , I∑Tm+X−1 are
∑
Tm+X interference terms which are useless. Note
that the distributive law applies here because mode-m multiplication is a multi-linear
operation. The highest order of αn is
∑
Tm +X − 1, which results from∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αn (fl − αn)
XẐl,X ×1 (fl − αn)T1Z(l)1,T1 ×2 · · · ×M (fl − αn)TMZ
(l)
M,TM
. (57)
Similar to DB-TPIR, the interference terms may contain some information of the
indices generated by all users. To guarantee privacy between users, servers will add
common randomness shared among them to the intermediate results to generate their
answers for each user. Specifically, the answer from server n is
A(θ1,··· ,θM )n = B
(θ1,··· ,θM )
n + Z˜0 + αnZ˜1 + · · ·+ α
∑
Tm+X−1
n Z˜
∑
Tm+X−1
=
∑
l∈[1:L]
1
fl − αnW
(l)(θ1, · · · , θM) + (I0 + Z˜0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
+ · · ·
+ α
∑
Tm+X−1
n (I
∑
Tm+X−1 + Z˜
∑
Tm+X−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J∑Tm+X−1
.
(58)
The matrix form of (58) is similar to that of 2-user case, we omit it here. Since L =
N − ∑Tm − X dimensions are occupied by desired message symbols and ∑Tm +
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X dimensions are occupied by the noisy versions of interference terms (J), the rate
achieved here is
R =
L
N
= 1−
∑
Tm +X
N
. (59)
C. Example
Let us provide a simple example for illustration.
N = 8 Servers, M = 3 users with T1 = T2 = 1, T3 = 2, X = 2, L = 2.
The storage at Server n and the queries from the 3 users are listed as follows.
Server ‘n’ (Replace α with αn)
S
(1)
n W
(1) + (f1 − α)Ẑ1,1 + (f1 − α)2Ẑ1,2
S
(2)
n W
(2) + (f2 − α)Ẑ2,1 + (f2 − α)2Ẑ2,2
Q
(1,θ1)
n,1 Q1,θ1 + (f1 − α)Z(1)1,1
Q
(1,θ1)
n,2 Q1,θ1 + (f2 − α)Z(2)1,1
Q
(2,θ2)
n,1 Q2,θ2 + (f1 − α)Z(1)2,1
Q
(2,θ2)
n,2 Q2,θ2 + (f2 − α)Z(2)2,1
Q
(3,θ3)
n,1 Q3,θ3 + (f1 − α)Z(1)3,1 + (f1 − α)2Z(1)3,2
Q
(3,θ3)
n,2 Q3,θ3 + (f2 − α)Z(2)3,1 + (f2 − α)2Z(2)3,2
The intermediate result is
B(θ1,θ2,θ3)n =
1
f1 − αnW
(1)(θ1, θ2, θ3) +
1
f2 − αnW
(1)(θ1, θ2, θ3) + I0 + · · ·+ α5nI5.
The highest order of α is 5 since T1 + T2 + T3 +X − 1 = 5 in this case. The answer from
the server is
A(θ1,θ2,θ3)n =
1
f1 − αnW
(1)(θ1, θ2, θ3) +
1
f2 − αnW
(2)(θ1, θ2, θ3) + (I0 + Z˜0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
+ · · ·+ α5n (I5 + Z˜5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J5
.
Evidently, the desired symbols occupy 2 dimensions, the aligned interference occupies
6 dimensions, and the rate achieved is 2/8 = 1/4.
VI. CONCLUSION
We explored the problem of M-way blind X-secure T -private information retrieval
(MB-XSTPIR). We found the asymptotic capacity of double blind T -private information
retrieval (DB-TPIR), which is a special case of MB-XSTPIR, under a bounded-latency
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constraint. The achievable scheme was constructed based on Cross-Subspace Alignment.
We then generalized the scheme using tensor-products into an MB-XSTPIR scheme
where the number of users (M), storage security-level (X) and privacy level of each
user’s index (T1, T2, · · · , TM ) can be arbitrarily chosen.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Corollary 1
The lower-bound follows already from the proof of achievability of Theorem 1. Here
we prove the upper bound. Any DB-TPIR scheme with parameters K1, K2, T1, T2 yields
two TPIR schemes. In one TPIR scheme, the user corresponds to User 1 of DB-TPIR.
User 2 in DB-TPIR generates a fixed index so that the user is retrieving a message in
a database with K1 messages (a fixed row of W) with T1-privacy constaint from N
servers. The rate of DB-TPIR cannot exceed 1−T1/N
1−(T1/N)K1
because this value is the capacity
of TPIR with N servers, K1 messages and a T1-privacy constraint according to [11].
The other TPIR scheme is similarly defined where the user corresponds to User 2 in
DB-TPIR, while User 1 in DB-TPIR generates a fixed index, thus the rate of DB-TPIR
cannot exceed 1−T2/N
1−(T2/N)K2
. Note that for large K1, K2, we have
1−T1/N
1−(T1/N)K1
→ 1 − T1
N
and
1−T2/N
1−(T2/N)K2
→ 1− T2
N
, so the upper bound follows in the asymptotic setting. 
B. Proof of Corollary 2
Let us focus on (17), i.e., inter-user privacy from the 1st user’s perspective. Similar
reasoning will apply to (18).
When T1 = T2 = 1, N = L + 2, we neglect the t on superscripts or subscripts of all
symbols. With this simplified notation, the private randomness of each of the two users
can be expressed as
Z1 = {Z(l)1 | l ∈ [1 : L]}, Z2 = {Z(l)2 | l ∈ [1 : L]}.
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The intermediate result computed by the nth server can be written as
B(θ1,θ2)n =
1
f1 − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n,1
′
W(1)Q
(2,θ2)
n,1 + · · ·+
1
fL − αnQ
(1,θ1)
n,L
′
W(L)Q
(2,θ2)
n,L (60)
=
1
f1 − αnQ
′
1,θ1W
(1)Q2,θ2 + · · ·+
1
fL − αnQ
′
1,θ1W
(L)Q2,θ2 (61)
+
∑
l∈[1:L]
(
Z
(l)
1
′
W(l)Q2,θ2 +Q
′
1,θ1
W(l)Z
(l)
2 + flZ
(l)
1
′
W(l)Z
(l)
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I0
(62)
+ αn
(
−
∑
l∈[1:L]
Z
(l)
1
′
W(l)Z
(l)
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
. (63)
Note here that even though the expressions for I0, I1 are fairly involved, they are just 2
random variables in Fq. Meanwhile, B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] is an invertible function of W(θ1, θ2), I0, I1.
Let us define three sets that contain all the components of I0, I1 except Q
′
1,θ1
W(1)Z
(1)
2
and Z
(1)
1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 . Specifically,
I1 = {Z(l)1
′
W(l)Q2,θ2 | l ∈ [1 : L]}, (64)
I2 = {Q′1,θ1W(l)Z(l)2 | l ∈ [2 : L]}, (65)
I3 = {Z(l)1
′
W(l)Z
(l)
2 | l ∈ [2 : L]}. (66)
So in q-ary units, we have
I(θ2;B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (67)
= I(θ2;W(θ1, θ2), I0, I1 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (68)
= I(θ2; I0, I1 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (69)
= H(I0, I1 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2))−H(I0, I1 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2) (70)
≤ 2−H(I0, I1 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3]) (71)
= 2−H(Q′1,θ1W(1)Z(1)2 ,Z(1)1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3]). (72)
(71) results from the fact that I0, I1 are in Fq and conditioning reduces entropy. (72)
holds because elements in I[1:3] can be subtracted from I0, I1.
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To proceed further we need to define the following new random variables.
E1 =
 1, if W(1) has full-rank,0, otherwise. (73)
E2 =
 1, if Z
(1)
1 6= 0 and Z(1)1 ⊥⊥ Q1,θ1,
0, otherwise.
(74)
Recall that Z
(1)
1 ⊥⊥ Qθ1 denotes that the two vectors are linearly independent. We have
Pr(E1 = 1) =
∏
i∈[1:K](q
K − qi−1)
qK2
, (75)
Pr(E2 = 1) = 1− 1
qK−1
, (76)
Pr(E1 = 1, E2 = 1) = Pr(E1 = 1) · Pr(E2 = 1). (77)
Note that the numerator of (75) is the order of the general linear group of degree K
over Fq. (77) follows because E1 and E2 are independent.
Consider the second term of (72), we have
H(Q′1,θ1W
(1)Z
(1)
2 ,Z
(1)
1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3]) (78)
≥H(Q′1,θ1W(1)Z(1)2 ,Z(1)1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1, E2) (79)
≥Pr(E1 = 1, E2 = 1)
H(Q′1,θ1W
(1)Z
(1)
2 ,Z
(1)
1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1). (80)
Let R1,R2 be two row vectors and
R1 = Q
′
1,θ1W
(1),R2 = Z
(1)
1
′
W(1). (81)
E1 = 1 implies that W
(1) has full-rank. E2 = 1 means that Z
(1)
1 and Q1,θ1 are linearly
independent. So R1,R2 are linearly independent. Let (i, j) ∈ [1 : K] × [1 : K], i 6= j be
the smallest pair such that
M =
 R1(i) R1(j)
R2(i) R2(j)
 , det(M) 6= 0. (82)
Such (i, j) must exist due to the linear independence of R1 and R2.
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Let Z2 = {Z(1)2 (k) | k ∈ [1 : K] \ {i, j}} contains all the entries of Z(1)2 except
Z
(1)
2 (i),Z
(1)
2 (j), for (80), we have
2 ≥H(Q′1,θ1W(1)Z(1)2 ,Z(1)1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1) (83)
=H(R1Z
(1)
2 ,R2Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1) (84)
≥H(R1Z(1)2 ,R2Z(1)2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1,R1,R2, i, j,Z2) (85)
=H
M
 Z(1)2 (i)
Z
(1)
2 (j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1,R1,R2, i, j,Z2
 (86)
=H(Z
(1)
2 (i),Z
(1)
2 (j) | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3], E1 = 1, E2 = 1,R1,R2, i, j,Z2) = 2 (87)
in q-ary units. (86) holds because we can subtract other components of R1Z
(1)
2 ,R2Z
(1)
2
given the conditioned terms. (87) results from the fact that M is invertible and Z
(1)
2 (i),
Z
(1)
2 (j) are independent of all conditioned terms.
So for the second term of (72) we have
H(Q′1,θ1W
(1)Z
(1)
2 ,Z
(1)
1
′
W(1)Z
(1)
2 | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2), θ2, I[1:3]) ≥ 2 Pr(E1 = 1, E2 = 1). (88)
Combining (88) with (72), we have
I(θ2;B
(θ1,θ2)
[1:N ] | θ1,Z1,W(θ1, θ2)) (89)
≤ 2
(
1− Pr(E1 = 1, E2 = 1)
)
(90)
= 2
(
1−
(
1− 1
qK−1
) ∏
k∈[1:K](q
K − qk−1)
qK2
)
(91)
≤ 2
(
1−
(
1− 1
qK−1
)
(qK − qK−1)K
qK2
)
(92)
= 2
(
1−
(
1− 1
qK−1
)(
1− 1
q
)K)
. (93)
To ensure that the LHS of (89) is bounded above by ǫ for q > q0, we can choose q0 to
be any value of q that bounds the RHS of (93) above by ǫ. 
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